How To Change Brain Function And Mind Control?
Introduction
The use of Deep Brain Stimulation technology (DBS) to treat mental disorders is one of the most promising and fastest-growing areas of neurosurgery research. However, when treating mental illness by directly altering brain function, neurosurgeons, neurologists, psychiatrists, and neuroengineers risk interpreting the effort as "mind control."
The purpose of this article is to solve this specific problem in the context of Deep Brain Stimulation that is currently being practised and researched by providing the definition of "mental control" applied to deep brain stimulation. In other words, it is not intended to explain the infinite ability of neurosurgeons working in the experimental wing of philosophical thinking, their ability to monitor and treat the brain and the patient's behaviour is endless. Therefore, this article aims to cover adult patients who have provided informed consent for the treatment of their mental or neurological diseases.
By narrowing the scope of the article, we hope to maximize its importance while minimizing distractions (although philosophically interesting). It should be noted that the position in question (adults being treated, people with informed consent - including patients with confinement syndrome, etc.) describes almost every person currently receiving DBS treatment, but except for the person being treated, receives an ongoing plant condition, lacking the ability to do anything, including the ability to provide consent.
Although the term "mind control" appears in contemporary literature discussing DBS progress, it is often underestimated or attracts reader attention, but never comes with an official definition. This is surprising, especially given that complex and powerful ethical literature on DBS and psychiatry covers related topics such as independence and informed consent, the promotion of originality and parenthood, and the unexpected side effects of stimulation to change personality and style among them, DBS can affect patients' perceptions of their identity. The common feature of the literature is that consent autonomy is one of the main features that must be preserved in the ethical practice of deep brain analysis, and this can be achieved in patients with mental illness through the practice of informed consent.
Past the contemporary neuroethics writing, mind control has been the subject of various books and articles. One of the most exhaustive records of psyche control with regards to electrical incitement of the human brain shows up in Elliot Valenstein's appropriately named Brain Control (Valenstein, 1973). While Valenstein never supplies a proper meaning of psyche control, his essential contention centres around undermining the idea that a subject's contemplations, decisions, or activities could be controlled through electrical incitement of the cerebrum by giving a definite record of its known abilities and constraints. Different conversations of psyche control will generally have zeroed in on psychopharmacologic techniques or conduct strategies for modifying mind work, for example, those utilized in the Central Intelligence Agency's MKULTRA program.
Perhaps the richest source of mind control accounts is not in official academic literature but in online accounts of individuals who claim to have witnessed acts of mind control or who claim to be a goal of mind control. In 2006, Bell et al. Provide an official textual analysis of 10 distinct examples. Although the authors explained that they take these novels as signs of delusional disorder and that their analysis focuses primarily on the social network of reports, they have been able to highlight many of the topics shared by the accounts. These common features help create an intuitive basis for what people think is qualified to control the mind. Novels often focused on:
Authoritarian organizations, such as "the police," "the Dutch government" or "Freemasonry intelligence agencies." Use some tools to increase brain function, such as "frequency weapon" or "brain implant" or "transmitter network", in order; to change the ideas or actions of the subject and without the consent of the subjects.
When proposing our standards for mind control, we retained and formalized all common topics of internet accounts except for the authoritarian organization. The authoritarian element was dropped because the authors saw no reason to exclude individuals acting alone from the ability to commit an act of mind control. This is particularly true in the context of deep brain stimulation where usually only one or a few people are responsible for managing the treatment. Therefore, we suggest using the term "mind control" to describe cases in which researchers or doctors using deep brain stimulation deliberately change patients' behaviour without consent and identify those cases using the criteria below.
After mentioning our official standards, we explain why standards are limited to behaviour and impartiality concerning the mental events of the subject during the mind control process. We then present test cases, which we argue do intuitively and are not considered eligible for mind control and are properly included and excluded by the proposed criteria respectively. After that, we apply the criteria to an unclear state of mind control. Finally, we conclude with a discussion on mind control in the context of accidental treatment, i.e. cases in which an individual sees a therapeutic effect of a mental illness that he or she has not agreed to treat, as in a patient treated with DBS for anxiety that has experienced a lull in alcoholism.
What are functional neurosurgery and its importance?
Functional neurosurgery has renewed interest in psychotherapy. Deep Brain Stimulation Technology (DBS) is the tool of choice in the current wave of clinical trials because it allows doctors to change the function of targeted brain areas in a reversible way to correct mental illnesses such as depression, addiction, anorexia nervosa, dementia, and obsessive-compulsive disorder. These promising treatments raise a key philosophical and human question.
Under what circumstances is "brain function change" equal to "mind control"? To answer this question, we need a definition of mind control. To this end, we have reviewed the philosophical and ethical literature and related neurosurgery to develop a set of standards for mind control in the context of DBS. We have also identified the clinical importance of these standards. Finally, we illustrate the importance of the proposed standard by paying special attention to opportunistic treatments, including deep brain stimulation, in the case of unexpected therapeutic benefits.
Standards of mind control
Modification of the cerebrum working through direct incitement (either actuation or concealment of activity possibilities) inside the subject's cerebrum qualifies as brain control when it meets the accompanying three rules in general:
- Result Criterion: Direct modification of the cerebrum's capacity should bring about a conduct change in the subject.
- Consent Criterion: The social change shouldn't be against the communicated will of the patient. The change should just have occurred without the subject's assent.
- Intent Criterion: The social change has probably been the objective or the motivation behind the individual or the gathering controlling the DBS. It can't be a mishap or an unseen side-effect, including aftereffects, of the incitement.
In rundown, brain function in the nervous system should perceptibly adjust the patient's conduct without the subject's assent and should be established for that reason.
Restricting Mind to Behavior
The above criteria are based on the assumption that the ultimate purpose of "mind control" is to modify an individual's and that the word "mind" is used in a popular psychological way to describe the intuitive mechanism of control. It is important to clarify the definition of "mind control" in the context of behaviour because this is the appropriate way to use DBS currently. This is because nerves and neurologists cannot make quite reliable intuition guesses about what effect a particular instance of DBS will have on a particular patient. So they should rely entirely on their observations of patient behaviours, which include their patients' reports.
To understand this point, keep in mind that neurosurgeons have a great deal of information about brain parts associated with certain faculties, such as speech composition and understanding, sense of touch on the body, the implementation of the intended movement, and vision. Moreover, they know that destroying these areas will leave the patient disabled, so protecting them during surgery is one of the surgeon's priorities. However, surgeons cannot predict exactly where these areas are in specific patients based on previous studies alone. Therefore, some cases of neurosurgery are performed as the patient wakes up so that he or she can report the sensations he or she experiences when the neurosurgeon applies an electrical current to the area of the brain of interest. Based on the patient's reports, the surgeon will individualize his approach to remove pathological tissue while sparing the functionally important Cortex, which is called the eloquent cortex. If the procedure is performed without behavioural reactions, there is a very high probability that an important crustacean area will be damaged, leaving the patient with a neurological disability.
The same type of procedure is also necessary for DBS practice. For example, patients should be closely monitored during surgery for behavioural signs, such as a reflex smile, so that the surgical team can determine the effect of stimulation once the pole and stimulus are implanted, specially trained neurologists adjust the stimulation criteria and closely observe the effect on the patient's symptoms. Finally, patients should follow closely during treatment in search of signs of cognitive decline, mood disorders, or other behavioural changes, sometimes coincidentally. In short, the use of DBS depends entirely on the behaviour as the only feedback mechanism for targeting the pole as well as modifying the stimulation parameters to achieve the desired effect. Because the person or people who control deep brain stimulation rely on observing behaviour, any state of mind control using deep brain stimulation necessarily depends entirely on behaviour. Therefore, the practical definition of mind control can be limited to behaviour only without directly addressing metaphysical questions related to the mind itself.
Obvious Test Cases
To get a clear example of brain function in the nervous system, we (fortunately) have to look beyond DBS's current practice to its more blurry past. One such case was published in 1963 in the journal Science by the Psychological Surgery Group, which operates under the supervision of Dr Robert Heath at the University of Tulane (Bishop et al., 1963). This article details the "self-alert" experience in which electrodes of a 35-year-old man were implanted into eight different brain structures, including the guilt head, barrier area, and almonds. These electrodes were classified by researchers as either "rewarding" or "hated" and the subject was given a crane and a button, when turned on, would activate one of the electrodes. As the experiment continued, the researchers changed the electrodes activated by the crane and the button and changed the stimulation parameters that are connected through the electrodes.
This experiment was based on previous studies on rats, cats, dogs, goats, monkeys, and glass-nosed dolphins, which showed that animal behaviour could be controlled predictably by placing stimulating electrodes in "reward" and "hating" brain areas and then linking stimulation through electrodes to elements of the animal environment. Therefore, researchers had good reason to expect specific behavioural responses in the subject of man. Furthermore, the authors never said that the person, referred to as "clearly abnormal", gave his consent to the experiment or understood why the experiment was conducted.
Given the proposed criteria for mind control, we believe that this situation satisfies the three. First, electrical stimulation of the brain was used in a way that clearly affected the behaviour of the person concerned and achieved the standard of the outcome. Secondly, the authors never stated that the patient had agreed to manipulate his conduct in this way, to meet the consent standard. Finally, behavioural change was expected by researchers who control the stimulation of the subject's brain, satisfying the criterion of intent.
After that, we must ask if there is an example of changing brain functions that obviously do not control the mind, and also, are correctly excluded by the result, consent, and criteria of intent? Consider idiopathic tremor therapy using deep brain stimulation. It is safe and effective and has been approved by the Food and Drug Administration.
It is thought to work by changing brain function (more specifically by causing a reversible functional lesion in a broken part of the brain), eventually allowing the patient to complete routine daily activities free of violent hand tremors that are the hallmark of the disease. This symptom relief is a direct result of electrical impulses in the brain, which change the standard shooting pattern; however, they are not a state of mind control.
Why isn't deep brain stimulation for idiopathic tremor therapy an example of mind control? After all, it can be said that one changes the behaviour of the patient's hands, from a trembling fist to a stable grip and that this was explicitly the purpose of the individual's programming of the DBS device. However, while this example meets the requirements of the outcome standard in addition to the criterion of intent, it fails to meet the consent standard because, in all cases of deep brain stimulation of idiopathic tremor, all patients agree to stimulation with an explicit desire to see this behavioural change. Interestingly, deep brain stimulation of idiopathic tremor can be considered "freedom of mind", unlike "mind control" because instead of preventing the patient from engaging in desirable behaviour or imposing unwanted behaviour, it allows the patient to act accordingly. Choices with less difficulty.
The same argument also applies to DBS treatments for mental illnesses such as depression. One may argue that depression, being a mental illness, is traditionally described as a mental illness. Therefore, if one can control the patient's disease, one must control the patient's mind, i.e. commit an act of mind control. The proposed criteria exclude this condition from mind control because, as in the case of deep brain stimulation for the treatment of basic tremor, the effect on the patient was with the patient's consent and, therefore, fails the consent standard.
Non-Obvious Test Case
While it is important to accommodate one's intuition standards, one must also go beyond and illustrate the dark area. Standards should be able to help the individual examine unclear cases and come to a logical judgment about their status as a ruler of reason or non-mental control. Thus, the above criteria are particularly useful when trying to identify border cases for mind control.
Going back to the past, think of the following case of an experiment conducted by José Delgado and his aides D. Obrador and Martin-Rodriguez in stimulating the comet's nucleus for epilepsy patients:
As shown by direct observation and by analysis of the record, within 30 s after application of caudate stimulation there was a significant change in the patient’s mood. During controls, he was reserved, his conversation was limited and he was concerned about his illness. After caudate stimulation, his spontaneous verbalization increased more than twofold and contained expressions of friendliness and euphoric behavior which culminated in jokes and loud singing in a gay cante jondo style, accompanied by tapping with his right hand, which lasted for about 2 min. The euphoria continued for about 10 min and then the patient gradually reverted to his usual, more reserved attitude. This increase in friendliness was observed following three different stimulation sessions of the caudate, and did not appear when other areas were tested .
In the description above, researchers try to correct the patient's epilepsy using an electric current. In testing one of their supposed objectives, they were able to devise a strong behavioural effect. The patient's attitude from quiet precaution to the sense of fun changed, i.e. the researchers significantly changed the patient's behaviour and thus met the criterion of the result, as well as the consent criterion because they did not get the patient's consent to change his behaviour in this way. At this point, one can argue, correctly, that this was an accident. The experimenters did not have the intuition to know that the patient would respond to the stimulation in this way so it could not be his intention to do so.
The underlying issue arose when stimulation was repeated, three different times, without any documentation that the patient wanted his personality to be manipulated in this way. While this may seem, at first, like a valid selection, it is important to realize that testers now have reason to believe that an individual's behaviour will be affected in a certain way. When they activated the stimulus and produced the expected effect, it was purposeful. In this way, the experimenters met the criterion of intent. As in the case of a schizophrenic patient who underwent the self-stimulation experience above, it seems clear that the researchers' motive was intellectual curiosity rather than malice. However, both cases show that hatred is not necessary to control the mind.
Serendipity and Mind Control
The above case raises an important question concerning several recently published studies in which people received DBS in an attempt to treat a single disease but instead witnessed a coincident improvement in a pathological mental illness. One coincidence was reported by Kuhn et al. (2007) who tried to treat a man with an anxiety disorder by placing DBS electrodes in his recant nucleus, a key component of the reward circuit in the mammalian brain. While the patient's anxiety did not improve, he noted significant remission in his alcoholism, prompting the group to propose the target as a potential treatment for alcoholism and addiction.
The second example comes from those who used deep brain stimulation in the hypothalamus area to try to help control the obese patient. Although the patient continued to gain weight (a fact that was excluded from the basic article and included only in online supplements), he tested the flashback while receiving test stimulation during surgery. This led researchers to conduct a series of studies to determine whether stimulation in the same area at a lower level, which does not cause memory reflux, can improve memory. To the researchers' surprise, they found a significant increase in the verbal memory of the subject. Based on this finding, the authors suggested that the anterior vault (a structure adjacent to the hypothalamus) was a target for the treatment of dementia and began enrolling patients for further study.
Finally, he describes a case in which a woman was receiving DBS from a belt wrap under creation to treat depression. The authors noted that although the patient continued to experience severe depression setbacks, she stopped suffering symptoms associated with accompanying anorexics. Based on the remarkable improvement the patient suffered, despite her marked improvement in depression, the authors suggested a goal to treat anorexia nervosa.
There are many strange similarities between the above cases. First, the intended effect of deep brain stimulation is either not seen or not particularly strong. Secondly, the psoriasis effect on the associated pathological disease (or the strengthening of normal abilities in the case of anterior stimulation of memory) was noticeable. Thirdly, based on these cases, all authors suggested testing stimulating sites as targets for monotherapy or responding to disease. The last common feature was that the authors never described a patient who had received informed consent to manage the common disease or to promote the patient's kidneys, with DBS. The only paper that commented on informed consent was that stated:
The procedure was approved by the University Health Network Research Ethics Board, and written informed consent was obtained under the guidance of a hospital ethicist, who served as a consent monitor. The basis of the approval for this man was the refractory nature of the obesity, the exhaustion of reasonable therapeutic alternatives, and the possibility of reducing the health risks of chronic obesity should the intervention prove successful.
In the paragraph above, the authors clearly stated a reasonable approach to obtaining informed consent to treat patient obesity. However, they did not prescribe receiving the patient's consent to use deep brain stimulation to enhance his verbal memory. Although the patient's informed consent to increase his memory was not reported, they proceeded to conduct a series of tests on the patient's memory function, furthermore, they did not mention discontinuing treatment once it became clear that deep brain stimulation was ineffective in treating obesity...
The above cases raise a critical question: were these examples of “mind control”? The patients had unexpected alterations in their behaviour and it appears, based on the descriptions of the cases, that the DBS was continued primarily because of these unexpected results. Further, the authors did not report that they repeated the informed consent process for the serendipitous alteration in the patient’s behaviour. The authors of this paper could conjecture that, once the researchers realized the unexpected effect DBS was having on their patient they consulted with him or her and received his or her blessing to continue therapy. Nonetheless, if they (or others) had not secured the consent of their patients for these new treatment indications, then they would be satisfying the Result (behaviour change) Consent (happening without patient’s consent) and Intent (behavioural change was the goal of DBS) criteria of mind control. Therefore, clinicians and researchers must secure additional consent in the case of serendipitous therapeutic benefit to avoid the charge that they are committing an act of mind control.
Conclusion
We have argued that deep brain stimulation is not synonymous with mind control; however, if patients are not properly protected, they can be victims of mind control even without malice on the part of those who control stimulation, especially in the case of psoriasis treatment for common psychiatric illnesses. While many cases of mind control are easily identifiable, there are certain cases where discrimination is more ambiguous.
This paper sets out a clear set of criteria to help more effectively and reliably clarify those mysterious cases. For the act to be considered control over the mind, the conduct of the individual (the criterion of the result) must be changed without his or her consent (consent standard) and this change in the individual's behaviour must be the goal of the person or group that controls the change (the criterion of intent). Relying on the intuition of researchers or doctors alone is not enough because these axioms can easily become cloudy, as in the psoriasis discovery of the effect of deep brain stimulation. Therefore, it is important to note that in cases of treatment encountered for mental illness patients also need explicit consent to treat common pathological diseases, otherwise the condition will be eligible for brain control. The authors intend to reduce the risk of such incidents by clarifying basic concepts.
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